Sorry for the cross post, but this is an important one potentially affecting all recipients.
This just crossed the Full Disclosure mailman moderated mailing list. It bears a careful read, and thought about whether a response is needed.
The implication is that if there is any use of a mailman password in common with a password you 'care' about, you need to take appropriate action at once. Also some backends merge Bugzilla and mailman password stores, which can cause unexpected secondary effects.
I have not seen a patch yet, and so one has to assume that the configs and passwords for all mailman moderated mailing lists are compromised. Once a fix issues, Mailman moderators will want to do a global password change, and local list modification.
-- Russ Herrold
---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2005 18:15:02 +0000 From: John Cartwright johnc@grok.org.uk To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com Subject: full-d] Administrivia: List Compromised due to Mailman Vulnerability
Hi
On 7th February 2005 I was notified of a number of potentially - compromised Full-Disclosure subscriber accounts. Following an investigation it appears that the Mailman configuration database was obtained from lists.netsys.com on 2nd January 2005 using a remote directory traversal exploit for a previously unpublished vulnerability in Mailman 2.1.5.
Subscriber addresses and passwords have been compromised. All list members are advised to change their password immediately. There do not appear to be further signs of intrusion although investigations continue.
The vulnerability lies in the Mailman/Cgi/private.py file:
def true_path(path): "Ensure that the path is safe by removing .." path = path.replace('../', '') path = path.replace('./', '') return path[1:]
A crafted URL fragment of the form ".../....///" will pass through the above function and return as "../", thus allowing directory traversal to occur using the following URL syntax to retrieve an arbitrary path.
/mailman/private/<list>/<path>?username=<username>&password=<password>
Expect vendor advisories nearer the end of the week, for now here is a suggested fix from Barry Warsaw:
SLASH = '/'
def true_path(path): "Ensure that the path is safe by removing .." parts = [x for x in path.split(SLASH) if x not in ('.', '..')] return SLASH.join(parts)[1:]
This issue only affects Mailman installations running on web servers that don't strip extraneous slashes from URLs, such as Apache 1.3.x.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2005-0202 to this mailman issue.
Cheers - John _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html