on 2/13/2008 7:44 AM nate spake the following:
Ross S. W. Walker wrote:
The agencies don't know what security backports vendor XYZ has implemented and frankly they don't care. All they have is a list of minimum version numbers that software must be at in order for it to be deemed "compliant".
So check the actual version number of the package. Using a remote network software scanner to detect security problems based on banner strings provided by the network software is nothing more than a false sense of security.
I think we will start seeing this in the PCI and HIPA compliance regulations first, but I wouldn't be surprised if it leaks out into GLBA and other regulations over time.
The scanning vendors will be forced to fix their products. It's perfectly acceptable, and preferred behavior to backport patches. Just look at the recent Samba thread here for a good reason why backporting is good. I'd be mightily pissed if RHEL or CentOS switched a version out from under me which caused breakage. I honestly cannot believe that RHEL did that for Samba. If anything introduce a new ALTERNATE package that has the incompatible changes in it and allow users to choose between that one and the original for their systems. That's just me though. Fortunately I don't really use Samba.
Wasn't the samba issue something that was fairly critical, but just couldn't be backported?