I was meaning STIG's. http://iasecontent.disa.mil/stigs/zip/Apr2015/U_RedHat_6_V1R7_STIG_SCAP_1-1_Benchmark.zip http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/scap/Pages/index.aspx I ended up creating scripts that address most of the issues that are listed above. -----Original Message----- From: centos-devel-bounces at centos.org [mailto:centos-devel-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of Ezequiel Brizuela [aka EHB or qlixed] Sent: Friday, May 08, 2015 5:28 PM To: The CentOS developers mailing list. Subject: Re: [CentOS-devel] [SIG Hardening] hardening classes Matthew, Do you refer the same old crypto export thingie that always hit us? Or you mean as a patch for the kernel as is? As a kernel patch the option as already was mentiones is to create an alternative kernel package, so you can use it or not based on your local rules/corp standard/legal restrictions. And I will be really happy if we can offer this as an alternate kernel. Is better than no offer it at all :) El vie, 8 de mayo de 2015 16:34, Conley, Matthew M CTR GXM <matthew.m.conley1.ctr at navy.mil> escribió: GRSec. I am on the fence for. I do like it, but do keep in mind, in certain settings (ie Gov't) it isn't allowed. It is simpler to learn, that said, I would have to relearn it. Regards Matthew Conley -----Original Message----- From: centos-devel-bounces at centos.org [mailto:centos-devel-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of Ezequiel Brizuela [aka EHB or qlixed] Sent: Friday, May 08, 2015 11:18 AM To: The CentOS developers mailing list. Subject: Re: [CentOS-devel] [SIG Hardening] hardening classes 2015-05-08 8:01 GMT-03:00 Leam Hall <leamhall at gmail.com>: On 05/07/15 18:32, Ezequiel Brizuela [aka EHB or qlixed] wrote: I really like to participate in this SIG, I mostly want to add a support for grsecurity hardened kernel, this can be an option/part of this SIG? Grsecurity have patches as stable for the Kernel 3.2 and 3.14 Branches, I know that is not the same branches that currently handle Centos7 Kernel, so I want to put this clear for the first moment and get your feedback about. Ezequiel, that would be interesting. A couple of questions come to mind. First, will it be optional? That is, can the grsecurity stuff be a choice of someone implementing our hardening recommendations? There are reasons, either lack of testing framework or application requirements, that might make a CentOS user want parts of the hardening stuff without all of it. I suppose that we can make the kernel optional, not as an addon but as a alternative kernel, the grsecurity kernel (http://grsecurity.net/), involves the use of pax for executable access control and have multiple level of security preconfigured to choose, so The second question, and this is based off my lack of knowledge, is how future open is your idea? Can it grow to cover the current kernels as well as the 4.x series? Currently the grsecurity got 'stable' patches for: * 3.1-3.2.68 - Last updated: 05/07/15 * 3.1-3.14.41 - Last updated: 05/07/15 And the 'test' patches for: * 3.1-4.0.2 - Last updated: 05/07/15 (Quick explanation of versioning: [grsec version]-[kernel vers]) So we have the long term branches 3.2.x, 3.14.x, and the stable 4.x as a test. I dunno when is going to change this from test to stable, but It will eventually happen. So, if this gain some interest, I can make a draft of how we can make this integration happen. I'm going to read and recapitulate the last SIG Security mails and review them to see actual status/next meetings to going forward with this. ~ Ezequiel Brizuela - AKA QliXeD ~ _______________________________________________ CentOS-devel mailing list CentOS-devel at centos.org http://lists.centos.org/mailman/listinfo/centos-devel -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smime.p7s Type: application/pkcs7-signature Size: 5647 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-devel/attachments/20150511/ebaefac5/attachment-0008.p7s>