On 09.Apr.2014, at 15:54, Johnny Hughes <johnny at centos.org> wrote: > On 04/07/2014 08:30 PM, Always Learning wrote: >> Thank you. >> >> What will the temporary packages be called ? >> >> > > > Since this is the first post about the openssl update, I want to answer > a couple questions here: > > 1. The first susceptible version of openssl in a CentOS release was > openssl-1.0.1e-15.el6, released on December 1, 2013. > > 2. The version of openssl that you should install to fix the issue is > openssl-1.0.1e-16.el6_5.7, released on April 8, 2014. > > 3. Versions of CentOS-6.5 openssl that were affected are: > openssl-1.0.1e-15.el6, openssl-1.0.1e-16.el6_5, > openssl-1.0.1e-16.el6_5.1, openssl-1.0.1e-16.el6_5.4. > > 4. Only CentOS-6.5 was affected. CentOS-6 at versions 6.4 or earlier > was not affected. No versions of CentOS-5 (or any other CentOS) were > affected. > > Besides doing updates, things you should do include: > > 1. Besides doing the updates, you should replace any certificates using > SSL or TLS that are openssl based. This includes VPN, HTTPD, etc. See > http://heartbleed.com/ for more info on impacted keys. update openssl, reissue the certificates (with new key!), revoke the old certificates. So far so good, but it goes further, doesn't it? Not only the ssl key could have been leaked, but also other sensible data. session keys, passwords, ... to handle this bug consequently, not only the ssl key and certificate has to be replaced, but also passwords, etc., i.e. every piece of sensible data that could have been transported over tls encrypted connections. Am I correct? This was about server side certificates, and that's a controlled environment. After you fixed your server it is not vulnerable anymore. Another issue is client certificates, and I am quite unsure the implications on these. I am assuming that client certificates are handed out to staff. Basically you can't really control where people install client certificates and which client software is used. If one is tricked to do a SSL Handshake with a malicious server, the key of the client certificate is leaked. Reissue of the cert won't help because on the other day there would be another malicious handshake with another bad server... Does this bug render authentication with client certificates obsolete/insecure/useless ? How does you handle client certificates after this heartbleed thing? Your opinions and knowlegde or specific links about client certificates and heartbleed would be appreciated. -- Markus