I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
1. Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment 2. SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment 3. Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment 4. OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux) 5. Firewall 6. IDS (Snort) 6. Central “syslog” server
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback / suggestion if you or your organization has undergone a PCI/DSS audit and what are the gotchas that you encountered, especially with respect to CentOS/ open source stack.
I came across this which kind of brings out issues between the implementer and the PCI/DSS auditor. http://webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/15098/pci-dss-compliance-for-a-vps-using-centos
Thanks very much.
Arun Khan wrote:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
- Firewall
- IDS (Snort)
- Central “syslog” server
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback /
<snip> I had a short-term contract with a company that a) did managed security, and b) was a root CA. I *think* the auditor missed one thing: as I understand it, if the three servers aren't hardwired to each other, *all* communications must be encrypted between them.
mark
On Fri, 25 May 2012 13:47:12 -0400 m.roth@5-cent.us wrote:
Arun Khan wrote:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
- Firewall
- IDS (Snort)
- Central “syslog” server
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback /
<snip> I had a short-term contract with a company that a) did managed security, and b) was a root CA. I *think* the auditor missed one thing: as I understand it, if the three servers aren't hardwired to each other, *all* communications must be encrypted between them.
It's always a matter of risk based analysis.
Were that three servers on the same network segment (logical and physical)? Do you have good and restrictive firewalls around them, and so on.
It's not good security or a good audit result if you just throb all the nobs.
Rui
wow, seems like quite a lot.
What "level" of PCI/DSS compliance are you going for?
The only other thing I might add....
Are you hosting the hardware? If it's hosted else where then the "facility" that's hosting the hardware needs to be PCI/DSS complaint.
On 5/25/2012 10:22 AM, Arun Khan wrote:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
- Firewall
- IDS (Snort)
- Central “syslog” server
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback / suggestion if you or your organization has undergone a PCI/DSS audit and what are the gotchas that you encountered, especially with respect to CentOS/ open source stack.
I came across this which kind of brings out issues between the implementer and the PCI/DSS auditor. http://webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/15098/pci-dss-compliance-for-a-vps-using-centos
Thanks very much.
Ken godee wrote:
wow, seems like quite a lot.
Heh. When I was working for the company, I had a guy who sat in easy earshot who was one of their folks who dealt with questions from companies and businesses. The *easiest* one, the lowest level, was 60 or 63 questions. The serious, highest one was over 220, and really required people on at least our level to answer some of them.
mark
What "level" of PCI/DSS compliance are you going for?
The only other thing I might add....
Are you hosting the hardware? If it's hosted else where then the "facility" that's hosting the hardware needs to be PCI/DSS complaint.
On 5/25/2012 10:22 AM, Arun Khan wrote:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
- Firewall
- IDS (Snort)
- Central “syslog” server
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback / suggestion if you or your organization has undergone a PCI/DSS audit and what are the gotchas that you encountered, especially with respect to CentOS/ open source stack.
I came across this which kind of brings out issues between the implementer and the PCI/DSS auditor. http://webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/15098/pci-dss-compliance-for-a-vps-using-centos
Thanks very much.
CentOS mailing list CentOS@centos.org http://lists.centos.org/mailman/listinfo/centos
On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 11:27 PM, Ken godee ken@perfect-image.com wrote:
wow, seems like quite a lot.
What "level" of PCI/DSS compliance are you going for?
I have to check this with the client. Credit card information will be encrypted and stored in client's own db.
The only other thing I might add....
Are you hosting the hardware? If it's hosted else where then the "facility" that's hosting the hardware needs to be PCI/DSS complaint.
The client will be hosting it on their own office premise (the physical security aspect is being handled by another vendor).
Thanks, -- Arun Khan
What "level" of PCI/DSS compliance are you going for?
I have to check this with the client. Credit card information will be encrypted and stored in client's own db.
Yup, this is exactly what they don't want people to do and I believe in the future they'll strive for just a handful of processors that will meet there criteria.
The client will be hosting it on their own office premise (the physical security aspect is being handled by another vendor).
I'm sure I'm talking way over my head at this point.... but this must be for a fairly large merchant (1M+ transactions yearly).
Not quite sure why one wouldn't use one of processors gateway facilities, there's convenient api's that would handle anything to do with cc's and at a "small fraction" of the price to set up and maintain.
2012/5/26 Ken godee ken@perfect-image.com:
What "level" of PCI/DSS compliance are you going for?
I have to check this with the client. Credit card information will be encrypted and stored in client's own db.
Yup, this is exactly what they don't want people to do and I believe in the future they'll strive for just a handful of processors that will meet there criteria.
The client will be hosting it on their own office premise (the physical security aspect is being handled by another vendor).
I'm sure I'm talking way over my head at this point.... but this must be for a fairly large merchant (1M+ transactions yearly).
"The client will be hosting it on their own office premise" sounds really bad. Usually this kind of systems are located in really secured datacenters.
-- Eero
2012/5/25 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems.
requirement "one primary function per server".
In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
true also.
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
Usually needed, if you use https or similar protocols.
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
SELinux is not usually needed.
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
Ossec (www.ossec.net) can do this.
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
Some hardening needed.
- Firewall
Hardware and software firewall on each network segment with nat enabled.
- IDS (Snort)
Ossec can do this
- Central “syslog” server
Ossec server with samhain is good solution for that.
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback / suggestion if you or your organization has undergone a PCI/DSS audit and what are the gotchas that you encountered, especially with respect to CentOS/ open source stack.
-- Eero
Hi Eero,
On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Eero Volotinen eero.volotinen@iki.fi wrote:
2012/5/25 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems.
requirement "one primary function per server".
In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
true also.
... snip ...
Thanks for your input on each points in OP. I appreciate it.
-- Arun Khan
2012/5/26 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com:
Hi Eero,
On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Eero Volotinen eero.volotinen@iki.fi wrote:
2012/5/25 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems.
requirement "one primary function per server".
In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
true also.
... snip ...
Thanks for your input on each points in OP. I appreciate it.
Usually you also need to implement WAF (web application firewall) on front of public webservers.
I think cheapest solution is use mod_security*) on apache and then proxy valid requests to tomcat.
*) http://www.modsecurity.org/
-- Eero, RHCE, CISSP
On Fri, 25 May 2012 22:52:13 +0530 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com wrote:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
Some advice from my practical professional knowledge...
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
There is always the scope to be understood.
If a server has card numbers somewhere, that server in on scope. So is any other server on the same network segment. So is any firewall delimiting these network segments.
Now... if you have a sufficiently large number of systems in scope, it's more practical to suppose PCI:DSS is in scope on all servers.
This eases your maintenance as you won't have exceptions to deal with, or justify, but if you have very few systems in scope rather than most of the others which aren't, it'll be your decision considering the work overload. I personally still advise to follow most rules on the non scoped servers as they are in fact wise rules.
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Not a good practice to say "6.2". Merely applying patches as time goes on means in some time you'll be running 6.3. Say 6. :)
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
Beware that many instructions tell you to disable selinux. I found that with a little bit of work and the help of audit2why and a few more selinux commands, you can usually work around bad apps by assuming the risk of allowing what they need.
A master will write his own selinux rules according to apps, though.
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
I advise OSSEC, rather than those, as it's a much better Host IDS.
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
I'm very wary of these generic ones, I usually bet on strongly reducing the packages installed and defining the security settings straight from my kickstart install scripts.
- Firewall
- IDS (Snort)
- Central “syslog” server
Be careful to send logs under TLS. I found that as a syslog server, rsyslog on RHEL/CentOS 5 *sucks* and gets you in trouble with ram exhaustion and crashes. I had to backport from 6 as the idiotic siem software running on that server demanded series 5 (even though it's just java *sigh*) and we ran into this issue with rsyslog, which is quite old under RHEL/CentOS.
This siem server does not support TLS syslog, only plain UDP/TCP unecrypted syslog, so one has to use a syslog server to receive under TLS then forward to the localhost.
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback / suggestion if you or your organization has undergone a PCI/DSS audit and what are the gotchas that you encountered, especially with respect to CentOS/ open source stack.
Use sudo extensively. If you have many servers without central password validation and too little people, it's better to have passwordless sudo restricted to admins group as identified by access via OpenSSH RSA keys than having to change your password every month on hundreds of servers.
Restrict your access to root shell, and keep it's password (written by two persons, each knowing their own half) in a safe where none of you can access without paper trail.
Yes, as an admin you can override that, but if you have externalized logs audited by a separate set of people, your trails may get you in trouble, so that risk is mitigated.
I came across this which kind of brings out issues between the implementer and the PCI/DSS auditor. http://webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/15098/pci-dss-compliance-for-a-vps-using-centos
I see there some things that are not true, namely WRT CentOS versions.
It has a lot to do with *how* you do your things, what evidences you register, whether the auditor is excessively strict and/or knows the technology and/or does a risk based assessment, how segmented is your network, and so on.
Rui
Thanks to all who responded to my query. Collectively, you raised my awareness PCI/DSS, related tool sets and such.
I have submitted my proposal to the client and I am sure I will discover a lot more if the proposal is accepted and I begin the implementation.
@ Rui Miguel Silva Seabra - appreciate your advice and suggestions.
-- Arun Khan
2012/5/26 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com:
Thanks to all who responded to my query. Collectively, you raised my awareness PCI/DSS, related tool sets and such.
I have submitted my proposal to the client and I am sure I will discover a lot more if the proposal is accepted and I begin the implementation.
Just remember that PCI DSS is not self service process, you usually need to use PCI QSA (Qualified Security Assessor) to complete your PCI process.
-- Eero
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 11:25 PM, Eero Volotinen eero.volotinen@iki.fi wrote:
... snip ..
Just remember that PCI DSS is not self service process, you usually need to use PCI QSA (Qualified Security Assessor) to complete your PCI process.
Yes, indeed. I am very well aware of it. In the OP I do mention "The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web ..."
Hi Arun,
On 05/26/2012 04:06 PM, Arun Khan wrote:
I have submitted my proposal to the client and I am sure I will discover a lot more if the proposal is accepted and I begin the implementation.
What are the chances that you might consider adding to the CentOS wiki on the PCI/DSS issues and process's ? Given that you are clearly about to allocate some time towards that.
Hi Karanbir,
On Mon, May 28, 2012 at 8:46 PM, Karanbir Singh mail-lists@karan.org wrote:
Hi Arun,
On 05/26/2012 04:06 PM, Arun Khan wrote:
I have submitted my proposal to the client and I am sure I will discover a lot more if the proposal is accepted and I begin the implementation.
What are the chances that you might consider adding to the CentOS wiki on the PCI/DSS issues and process's ? Given that you are clearly about to allocate some time towards that.
I am certainly open to your suggestion once I get the project and execute it :)
-- Arun Khan
Rui:
On Sat, May 26, 2012 at 3:36 AM, Rui Miguel Silva Seabra rms@1407.orgwrote:
On Fri, 25 May 2012 22:52:13 +0530 Arun Khan knura9@gmail.com wrote:
I have a client project to implement PCI/DSS compliance.
Some advice from my practical professional knowledge...
Excellent post...
The PCI/DSS auditor has stipulated that the web server, application middleware (tomcat), the db server have to be on different systems. In addition the auditor has also stipulated that there be a NTP server, a "patch" server,
There is always the scope to be understood.
If a server has card numbers somewhere, that server in on scope. So is any other server on the same network segment. So is any firewall delimiting these network segments.
Now... if you have a sufficiently large number of systems in scope, it's more practical to suppose PCI:DSS is in scope on all servers.
This is what we ended up doing. It was far easier to build everything to be compliant than to selectively push PCI compliant configurations to a handful of servers.
This eases your maintenance as you won't have exceptions to deal with, or justify, but if you have very few systems in scope rather than most of the others which aren't, it'll be your decision considering the work overload. I personally still advise to follow most rules on the non scoped servers as they are in fact wise rules.
The Host OS on all of the above nodes will be CentOS 6.2.
Not a good practice to say "6.2". Merely applying patches as time goes on means in some time you'll be running 6.3. Say 6. :)
Below is a list of things that would be necessary.
- Digital Certificates for each host on the PCI/DSS segment
- SELinux on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS network segment
Beware that many instructions tell you to disable selinux. I found that with a little bit of work and the help of audit2why and a few more selinux commands, you can usually work around bad apps by assuming the risk of allowing what they need.
A master will write his own selinux rules according to apps, though.
We have selinux in our base configuration. The only caveat here is that vendors often will refuse to support an application if selinux is enabled. Though I know very well that selinux itself is not the problem (i.e., it's the policy that needs to be tweaked), the app owners claim that there is no way to figure out what is wrong when selinux is enabled.
- Tripwire/AIDE on each Linux host in the PCI/DSS segment
I advise OSSEC, rather than those, as it's a much better Host IDS.
- OS hardening scripts (e.g. Bastille Linux)
I'm very wary of these generic ones, I usually bet on strongly reducing the packages installed and defining the security settings straight from my kickstart install scripts.
- Firewall
- IDS (Snort)
- Central “syslog” server
Be careful to send logs under TLS. I found that as a syslog server, rsyslog on RHEL/CentOS 5 *sucks* and gets you in trouble with ram exhaustion and crashes. I had to backport from 6 as the idiotic siem software running on that server demanded series 5 (even though it's just java *sigh*) and we ran into this issue with rsyslog, which is quite old under RHEL/CentOS.
This siem server does not support TLS syslog, only plain UDP/TCP unecrypted syslog, so one has to use a syslog server to receive under TLS then forward to the localhost.
However, beyond this I would appreciate any comments/feedback / suggestion if you or your organization has undergone a PCI/DSS audit and what are the gotchas that you encountered, especially with respect to CentOS/ open source stack.
Use sudo extensively. If you have many servers without central password validation and too little people, it's better to have passwordless sudo restricted to admins group as identified by access via OpenSSH RSA keys than having to change your password every month on hundreds of servers.
We use sudo among other things. Lately we have enabled ACLs to allow specific individuals access to specific configuration files.
The main caveat with sudo is finding those applications that allow shell access, etc..
Restrict your access to root shell, and keep it's password (written by two persons, each knowing their own half) in a safe where none of you can access without paper trail.
Yes, as an admin you can override that, but if you have externalized logs audited by a separate set of people, your trails may get you in trouble, so that risk is mitigated.
I came across this which kind of brings out issues between the implementer and the PCI/DSS auditor. <
http://webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/15098/pci-dss-compliance-for-a...
I see there some things that are not true, namely WRT CentOS versions.
It has a lot to do with *how* you do your things, what evidences you register, whether the auditor is excessively strict and/or knows the technology and/or does a risk based assessment, how segmented is your network, and so on.
And this is so true. It is so much dependent on the auditor and how he/she interprets the spec.
Again, thanks for an excellent post.
-
Arun Khan -
Eero Volotinen -
Karanbir Singh -
Ken godee -
Kwan Lowe -
m.roth＠5-cent.us -
Rui Miguel Silva Seabra