On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 11:15 AM, Karanbir Singh mail-lists@karan.org wrote:
On 07/04/2014 02:46 PM, Nico Kadel-Garcia wrote:
Please consider the use of signed GPG tags for actualSRPM updates, rather than merely relying on '[package].metadata, to help assure provenance for people who may test or rebuild security components.
the content you get is pushed over https, the implementation on git.centos.org seems fairly secure. the content into the machine is via ssh, over a guranteed ( in as much as network can be guranteed ) link.
we are also preventing anyone else from being able to commit with the source importer username/email and or using the word 'import' as the first chat in the commit.
Thanks. But Karanbir, "commit" is not the problem I'm referring to. It's the ability to substitute a trojaned, fake repository in between you and the client, to commit a "man-in-the-m8iddle" attack Valid SSL certificates, and a clean repoository at git.centos.org: the ability to verify a particulr "tag" with a GPG tag, particularly a cloned local working copy with the "tags" from upstream for reference, is invaluable. Red Hat's, and CentOS's, SRPM repositories avoided this by having GPG signed SRPM's for reference. The GPG signature chain is more safely managed and verified, in many ways, than the SSL has been.
some of this is convention, but as the source that we consume, we are fairly sure of what is going through. If there are any specific concerns about code, do point them out - and if its security related, then email security@centos.org instead of a public list.
I'll take this issue over there.
regards
-- Karanbir Singh +44-207-0999389 | http://www.karan.org/ | twitter.com/kbsingh GnuPG Key : http://www.karan.org/publickey.asc _______________________________________________ CentOS-devel mailing list CentOS-devel@centos.org http://lists.centos.org/mailman/listinfo/centos-devel